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The Reflective Mind: Examining Individual Differences
in Susceptibility to Base Rate Neglect with fMRI
Oshin Vartanian1,2, Erin L. Beatty1,3, Ingrid Smith1, Kristen Blackler1, Quan Lam1,
Sarah Forbes1,4, and Wim De Neys5,6,7
Abstract
■ Performance on heuristics and bias tasks has been shown to
be susceptible to bias. In turn, susceptibility to bias varies as a
function of individual differences in cognitive abilities (e.g., intel-
ligence) and thinking styles (e.g., propensity for reflection). Using
a classic task (i.e., lawyer–engineer problem), we conducted two
experiments to examine the differential contributions of cognitive
abilities versus thinking styles to performance. The results of
Experiment 1 demonstrated that the Cognitive Reflection Test
(CRT)—a well-established measure of reflective thinking—
predicted performance on conflict problems (where base rates
and intuition point in opposite directions), whereas STM pre-
dicted performance on nonconflict problems. Experiment 2 con-
ducted in the fMRI scanner replicated this behavioral dissociation
and enabled us to probe their neural correlates. As predicted,
conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the
ACC—a key region for conflict detection—even in cases when
participants responded stereotypically. In participants with
higher CRT scores, conflict problems were associated with greater
activation in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and activation
in PCC covaried in relation to CRT scores during conflict prob-
lems. Also, CRT scores predicted activation in PCC in conflict
problems (over and above nonconflict problems). Our results
suggest that individual differences in reflective thinking as
measured by CRT are related to brain activation in PCC—a region
involved in regulating attention between external and internal
foci. We discuss the implications of our findings in terms of PCC’s
possible involvement in switching from intuitive to analytic mode
of thought. ■
INTRODUCTION
A major theme emerging from the heuristics and bias
literature has been that human reasoning can at times de-
viate from normative principles of statistical prediction.
One task that has been used repeatedly to demonstrate
such an effect is Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973) classic
lawyer–engineer problem. In the original version of the
task, participants were presented with the following
description:
A panel of psychologists have interviewed and admin-
istered personality tests to 30 engineers and 70 law-
yers, all successful in their respective fields. On the
basis of this information, thumbnail descriptions of
the 30 engineers and 70 lawyers have been written.
You will find on your forms five descriptions, chosen
at random from the 100 available descriptions. For
each description, please indicate your probability that
the person described is an engineer, on a scale from 0
to 100.
One of the five descriptions provided read as follows:
Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four
children. He is generally conservative, careful, and am-
bitious. He shows no interest in political and social
issues and spends most of his free time on his many
hobbies which include some carpentry, sailing, and
mathematical puzzles. The probability that Jack is
one of the 30 engineers in the sample of 100 is ___%.
Despite the fact that, based on the prior odds, a ran-
domly selected person would most likely be a lawyer,
participants’ subjective probabilities revealed that they
were more likely to consider Jack to be an engineer.
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) explained this discrepancy
in terms of the representativeness heuristic, according to
which base rates are largely ignored if individuating
information is made available, which in turn drives peo-
ple to respond stereotypically based on the “essential
features of the evidence” (p. 238).
Although this bias has been replicated many times, the
precise reasons underlying it continue to be a matter
of debate. One influential model used to explain it is
dual-process theory, according to which base rate neglect
occurs because the task creates a conflict between an in-
tuitively cued response consistent with the individuating
information and an analytically cued response consistent
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with the base rate information. More specifically, based
on the default interventionist variant of dual-process the-
ory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011), the
lawyer–engineer problem results in a fast and automatic
intuitive response, which unless curtailed will be norma-
tively incorrect (i.e., stereotypical). Its correction de-
pends on the downstream involvement of the analytic
system (see also Kahneman, 2000).
However, there are two lines of evidence that cast
doubt on the default interventionist account of base rate
neglect. First, there is behavioral evidence to suggest
that, despite responding stereotypically, biased reasoners
are nevertheless sensitive to the presence of conflict in
the form of increased response latency (e.g., Stupple,
Ball, & Ellis, 2013; Bonner & Newell, 2010; Villejoubert,
2009; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008) and decreased post-
decisional confidence (e.g., Gangemi, Bourgeois-Gironde,
& Mancini, 2015; De Neys, Rossi, & Houdé, 2013; De Neys,
Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011). Second, based on a series of
experiments using the two-response paradigm,1 it has
been demonstrated that participants can generate initial
responses in accordance with base rates quickly and with
high degree of confidence (Bago & De Neys, 2017;
Newman, Gibb, & Thompson, 2017). In other words, peo-
ple can respond logically to conflict problems in an intui-
tive manner. This finding is consistent with the idea
that some elementary logical processing might be occur-
ring relatively early in the reasoning process (e.g., De
Neys, 2012, 2014; see also Pennycook, Fugelsang, &
Koehler, 2015). Overall, these results suggest that there
are multiple paths for arriving at the correct solution to a
base rate problem—involving both deliberate and intuitive
processes.
Of particular relevance to this study, De Neys, Vartanian,
and Goel (2008) administered a variety of base rate
problems to participants in the fMRI scanner. On conflict
problems, base rates and intuition pointed in opposite
directions, whereas on nonconflict problems base rates
and intuition pointed in the same direction. As expected,
conflict problems were associated with greater activation
in the ACC—a key region for conflict detection (see Prado
& Noveck, 2007; van Veen & Carter, 2006; Botvinick,
Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone,
& Nieuwenhuis, 2004). Interestingly, related electrophysio-
logical work has demonstrated that participants are at-
tuned not only to the presence of conflict but also to its
degree (Prado, Kaliuzhna, Cheylus, & Noveck, 2008). In
addition, when conflict problems were solved correctly,
this resulted in additional activation in the right inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG)—a region of the brain involved in re-
sponse inhibition (see Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004,
2014; Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian, & Robbins,
2003; see also Prado & Noveck, 2007). This finding is con-
sistent with the idea that responding in accordance with
base rates on conflict problems necessitates not only the
detection of conflict but also the deployment of executive
resources for suppressing a prepotent heuristic response
in favor of a normative response. However and perhaps
most interestingly, ACC was also activated when partici-
pants responded stereotypically to conflict problems, sug-
gesting that there was an awareness of bias despite the
inability to overcome it (see also Simon, Lubin, Houdé, &
De Neys, 2015).
Individual Differences and Base Rate Neglect
One approach to elucidating the mechanisms that under-
lie performance impairments in heuristics and bias tasks
has been to focus on theoretically relevant individual dif-
ferences that predict performance. In an early contribu-
tion to this line of research, Stanovich and West (1998)
examined the relationship between cognitive ability and
performance on a host of tasks in this domain. Their
work was motivated by the premise that “more reflective
and engaged reasoners will be more likely to affirm the
axioms that define normative reasoning” (p. 293; see also
Slovic & Tversky, 1974). They operationalized cognitive
ability based on Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores be-
cause they are known to gauge intellectual engagement,
reflective thought, and thorough information processing.
As predicted, participants with higher SAT scores were
less likely to fall prey to deviations from normative ax-
ioms than participants lower in cognitive ability. Impor-
tantly, the effect of cognitive ability was greater if the
problem engaged both analytic and heuristic modes of
information processing that cued opposite responses.
In such cases, the positive contribution of higher SAT
scores was attributed to deeper engagement with the
problems, in turn leading to better performance (see also
Stanovich & West, 2000, 2008).
Unlike SAT scores that represent a blend of cognitive
ability and thinking style, more recent work has system-
atically parsed out the relative contributions of individual
differences in cognitive abilities (e.g., intelligence) and
thinking styles (e.g., propensity for reflection) on perfor-
mance in heuristics and biases tasks. Toplak, West, and
Stanovich (2011) examined the contributions of cognitive
ability and thinking style on performance on a wide host
of tasks involving probabilistic reasoning, hypothetical
thought, theory justification, scientific reasoning, and
the tendency to think statistically. Cognitive ability was
measured using the Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning
subtests from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelli-
gence (Wechsler, 1999), and the disposition to think
analytically was measured using the Cognitive Reflection
Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005)—an instrument designed to
measure the propensity to suppress a fast intuitive re-
sponse in favor of a reflective, deliberative response
(e.g., A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs
$1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
Incorrect answer = 10 cents; correct answer = 5 cents).
CRT problems are believed to be ideal for probing the
interplay between heuristic and analytic thinking
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precisely because the incorrect but intuitive response
typically appears immediately, which in turn must be
suppressed in favor of the correct and analytically derived
response. Toplak et al. (2011) demonstrated that CRT
scores were a unique predictor of performance on
heuristics and biases tasks after controlling for cognitive
ability. Echoing the findings of Toplak et al. (2011),
Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, and Fugelsang (2014)
have demonstrated that CRT scores and scores on a brief
measure of verbal intelligence (WordSum) were both
independent predictors of conflict base rate problems.
The results of Toplak et al. (2011) and Pennycook,
Cheyne, et al. (2014) suggest that both cognitive ability
and thinking styles contribute positively to performance
on base rate problems, although CRT scores appear to
be a stronger predictor of conflict detection.
The Present Study
Although previous research has already examined the
neural bases of choices made under conflict in the con-
text of heuristics and biases and reasoning tasks (e.g., De
Neys et al., 2008; Prado et al., 2008; Prado & Noveck,
2007), there is a dearth of research that has explicitly
focused on parsing out the relative contributions of cog-
nitive abilities and thinking styles in relation to perfor-
mance on those tasks involving neuroimaging data. To
address that gap, we conducted two experiments to as-
sess the relative contributions of cognitive ability (intelli-
gence and STM) and thinking style (CRT) to performance
on conflict and nonconflict base rate problems. In our be-
havioral study (Experiment 1), all measures were admin-
istered in our laboratory using paper-and-pencil format,
and performance on the base rate task was not timed.
In contrast, in the second study, the base rate task was
administered inside the fMRI scanner and was timed.
Our design enabled us to (a) expand our measures of
cognitive ability beyond intelligence to also include mea-
sures of STM and (b) assess the reliability of our behav-
ioral findings across two experiments. Critically, however,
our design enabled us to probe the neural correlates of
individual differences in CRT scores while participants
were engaged in conflict problems. We hypothesized that
(a) CRT scores would predict performance uniquely on
conflict but not on nonconflict problems and (b) CRT
scores would be related to brain activation to a greater
extent during conflict than nonconflict problems. Given
that CRT is believed to reflect one’s ability to inhibit an
intuitive response and switch to an analytic mode of
thought, we expected that CRT scores would covary with
brain activation in brain regions associated with executive
functions (Miyake et al., 2000)—in particular, right IFG
given its role in inhibition (see Aron et al., 2003, 2004,
2014) and the pFC and ACC given their contributions
to set shifting (see Bissonette, Powell, & Roesch, 2013;
Robbins, 1996).
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
The participants were 30 volunteers (25 men, 5 women)
recruited from the Department of National Defence. The
participants ranged in age from 20 to 46 years (M= 29.4 ±
6.5 years). Their levels of education were as follows: high
school diploma (n = 9), college diploma (n = 7), univer-
sity degree (n = 10), graduate degree (n = 3), none of
the above (n = 1). The protocol for the study was
approved by the Defence Research and Development
Canada (DRDC) Human Research Ethics Committee.
Materials and Procedures
All measures were administered in our laboratory at
DRDC (Toronto Research Centre). We administered
two STM tasks, modeled after Harrison et al.’s (2013)
simple working memory span tasks. For word (verbal)
span, four-letter monosyllabic words were presented
one at a time on a monitor. After each block of words, par-
ticipants were prompted by the software to recall the words
they saw in the order in which they were presented. Blocks
ranged from three to nine words. For matrix span, partici-
pants were presented with a 4 × 4matrix where one square
(out of 16) appeared in red and the rest in white. At the end
of each block of matrices, participants were instructed to
recall the locations of the red squares in the order in which
they were presented. Blocks ranged from three to nine
matrices. The computer task provided a detailed description
of each task before the start, and the experimenter reviewed
the instructions and provided an example in each case to
the participants. Note that both the word and matrix span
are so-called simple working memory span tasks that pri-
marily tax STM storage capacity (e.g., Harrison et al., 2013;
Cowan, 2008; Unsworth & Engle, 2007).
Our measures of crystallized and fluid intelligence
consisted of the Vocabulary (10 min) and Block Patterns
(10 min) subsets of the Shipley-2, which were in turn
standardized and converted into a single full-scale intelli-
gence score (Shipley, Gruber, Martin, & Klein, 2009). We
administered the seven-item version of the CRT, which
built on Frederick’s (2005) original three-item version by
adding four more items (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014).
Our 48 base rate problems (24 conflict, 24 nonconflict)
were selected from Pennycook, Cheyne, et al.’s (2014)
item pool. The participants were informed that, in a big
research project, a large number of studies were carried
out where short personality descriptions of the partici-
pants were made. In every study, there were participants
from two populations groups (e.g., carpenters and
policemen). In each study, one participant was drawn
at random from the sample. They were informed that
they would get to see a personality trait for this randomly
chosen participant and that they would also receive infor-
mation about the composition of the population groups
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tested in the study in question. For each problem, they
would then be asked to indicate to which group the par-
ticipant most likely belonged. They were then given two
practice problems for familiarization purposes. The fol-
lowing depicts a representative item from the 48-item
set:
This study contains:
Lawyers and clowns
Person ‘L’ is argumentative
There are 3 lawyers/997 clowns
Person ‘L’ is more likely to be:
1) Clown
2) Lawyer
Note that on all problems, the base rate contrast between
the two categories was similarly extreme. Two randomized
orders of the 48-item set were prepared. Each problem
appeared on a separate sheet of paper in a booklet. The
two sets were administered randomly to the participants.
There was no time limit for completing the task.
Results
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for all
variables are reported in Tables 1 and 2. As expected,
accuracy was significantly higher for nonconflict than
conflict problems, t(29) = 5.45, p < .001, d = 1.27.2 In
addition, participants did not always exhibit internal con-
sistency in their response pattern to conflict problems:
Whereas 15 participants responded consistently in accor-
dance with base rates or stereotypically, the remaining
15 participants registered both types of responses across
conflict problems. Next, using step-wise regression, we
examined the effects of STM (verbal, matrix), intelli-
gence, and CRT scores—separately for conflict and non-
conflict problems. Matrix span was the only significant
predictor of performance on nonconflict problems, β =
.026, p = .041, accounting for 15% of the variance (R2) in
performance. In contrast, CRT was the only significant
predictor of performance on conflict problems, β =
.607, p = .018, accounting for 21.6% of the variance
(R2) in performance. Because of statistically significant
correlations among our predictors, we have also reported
the results of regressions involving accuracy on conflict
and nonconflict problems separately for each predictor
(Table 3). As was the case before, CRT was the sole
predictor of performance on conflict problems, whereas
matrix span was the sole predictor of performance on
nonconflict problems.
Table 1. The Descriptive Statistics for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2
Conflict Nonconflict IQ CRT WS MS
Exp. 1 57.73% (41.09) 97.93% (5.97) 25.07 (3.30) 53.56% (29.81) 5.58 (1.30) 5.61 (.93)
Exp. 2 51.36% (12.51) 95.44% (4.63) 25.83 (3.90) 53.79% (34.17) 9.49 (1.90) 8.75 (2.09)
Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Exp. = Experiment; IQ = intelligence as measured by Shipley-2; MS = matrix span; WS = word span.
Table 2. The Zero-order Correlation Matrix for All Variables
in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2
Conflict Nonconflict IQ CRT WS MS
Conflict – .19 .30 .46* .32 .22
Nonconflict .34* – .30 .35 .09 .39*
IQ .29 .35* – .44* .40* .49**
CRT .41** .42** .52*** – .43* .46*
WS .32* .44** .50*** .43** – .55**
MS .22 .36* .46** .57*** .53*** –
Experiment 1 = above the diagonal; Experiment 2 = below the diago-
nal; IQ = intelligence as measured by Shipley-2; MS = matrix span;
WS = word span.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.
Table 3. Regressions of Accuracy Involving Conflict and
Nonconflict Problems on Individual Predictors in Experiment 1
and Experiment 2
Variable Conflict β Nonconflict β
Experiment 1
CRT .62 (.24)* .07 (.04)
IQ .03 (.02) .01 (.00)
WS .10 (.06) .00 (.01)
MS .01 (.09) .03 (.01)*
Experiment 2
CRT .00 (.00)** .00 (.00)**
IQ .01 (.01) .00 (.00)*
WS .02 (.01)* .01 (.00)**
MS .01 (.01) .01 (.00)*
Standard errors of measurement appear in parentheses. β = Unstan-
dardized weights; IQ = intelligence as measured by Shipley-2; WS =
word span; MS = matrix span.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
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EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Participants
The participants were 44 neurologically healthy right-
handed volunteers (31 men, 13 women) with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision recruited from the Department
of National Defence. No participant reported color blind-
ness. The participants ranged in age from 20 to 56 years
(M = 35.5 ± 11.3 years). Their levels of education
were as follows: high school diploma (n = 12), college
diploma (n = 6), university degree (n = 19), graduate
degree (n = 7), none of the above (n = 2). The protocol
for the study was approved by the DRDCHuman Research
Ethics Committee and by the Research Ethics Board of
Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre. Handedness was
assessed using a standard self-report questionnaire
(Oldfield, 1971).
Materials and Procedure
With the exception of the base rate task, all measures
were administered in our laboratory at DRDC (Toronto
Research Centre). Shipley-2 and STM tasks were identical
to Experiment 1. In contrast, we divided the CRT randomly
into three-item and four-item versions, and each participant
completed one of the two versions. The reason for the
discrepancy in the number of CRT items between Experi-
ment 1 and Experiment 2 was that the latter was conducted
as part of a larger study for which many other measures un-
related to this specific experiment were also administered,
forcing us to minimize the duration of each individual
paper-and-pencil measure. However, critically, note that
average accuracy rate and variance on CRT scores in
Experiment 2 is essentially identical to Experiment 1:
53.56% (SD = 29.81, range = 0–100). The base rate task
included the exact same 48 items as the set administered
in Experiment 1 (Pennycook, Cheyne, et al., 2014) but, in
this case, was administered inside the fMRI scanner
(Figure 1). Before entering the scanner, participants were
given two practice problems for familiarization purposes.
Image Acquisition and Processing
A 3-T MR scanner with an eight-channel head coil (Dis-
covery MR750, 22.0 software, GE Healthcare) was used
to acquire T1 anatomical volume images (0.86 × 0.86 ×
1.0 mm voxels). For functional imaging, T2*-weighted
gradient-echo spiral-in/out acquisitions were used to pro-
duce 26 contiguous 5-mm thick axial slices (repetition
time = 2000 msec, echo time = 30 msec, flip angle =
70°, field of view = 200 mm, 64 × 64 matrix, voxel dimen-
sions = 3.1 × 3.1 × 5.0 mm), positioned to cover the
whole brain. The first five volumes were discarded to allow
for T1 equilibration effects. The number of volumes
acquired was 303.
Statistical Analysis
Data were analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping
(SPM8; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). Head movement was
less than 2 mm in all cases. All functional volumes were
spatially realigned to the first volume. Given that the vol-
umes were acquired using a descending sequence with
short repetition time, slice timing to correct for variation
in acquisition time followed realignment (Huettel, Song,
& McCarthy, 2004). A mean image created from realigned
volumes was spatially normalized to the MNI EPI brain
template using nonlinear basis functions. The derived
spatial transformation was applied to the realigned T2*
Figure 1. Procedure for the
base rate task. Adapted with
permission from Pennycook,
Cheyne, et al. (2014).
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volumes and spatially smoothed with an 8-mm FWHM
isotropic Gaussian kernel. Time series across each voxel
were high-pass filtered with a cutoff of 128 sec, using co-
sine functions to remove section-specific low-frequency
drifts in the BOLD signal. Condition effects at each voxel
were estimated according to the general linear model,
and regionally specific effects were compared using
linear contrasts. The BOLD signal was modeled as a
box-car, convolved with a canonical hemodynamic re-
sponse function. We applied a cluster-level correction
within SPM8 for determining statistical significance.
Specifically, reported activations survived a voxel-level
threshold of p < .001 (uncorrected for multiple compar-
isons) and a cluster-level threshold of p < .05 corrected
for multiple comparisons (FWE).
Using an event-related design, in the first level, we
specified regressors corresponding to the following
points in the problem structure (see Figure 1): (1) fixa-
tion point, (2) the groups in question, (3) stereotype in-
formation, (4) base rates, (5) prompt, and (6) motor
response. In addition, the RT associated with each motor
response was included in the model as a parameter and
modeled out of the analyses by assigning a value of 0 to
its regressor in subsequent analyses. All reported neural
analyses are based on the prompt time point (i.e., last
slide in Figure 1). Importantly, prompt problems were
in turn separated into four separate regressors based
on performance as follows: conflict (correct), conflict (in-
correct), nonconflict (correct), nonconflict (incorrect).
Results
Behavioral
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for all
variables are reported in Tables 1 and 2. As expected,
accuracy was significantly higher for nonconflict than
conflict problems, t(43) = 24.84, p < .001, d = 4.40.
Here, too, the participants were not internally consistent
in terms of their response pattern to conflict problems.
Specifically, no participant responded consistently in ac-
cordance with base rates or stereotypically across conflict
problems. In addition, in terms of RT, we replicated
Pennycook, Cheyne, et al.’s (2014) result by demonstrat-
ing that RT was significantly longer for conflict problems
regardless of stereotypical or base rate responses com-
pared with correct responses on nonconflict problems,
F(2, 86) = 16.21, p < .001, ηp
2 = .27 (Figure 2).3 Next,
using step-wise regression, we examined the effects of
STM (verbal, matrix), intelligence, and CRT scores—sep-
arately for conflict and nonconflict problems. Word span
was the only significant predictor of performance on non-
conflict problems, β = .011, p = .003, accounting for
19.2% of the variance (R2) in performance. In contrast,
CRT was the only significant predictor of performance
on conflict problems, β = .001, p = .006, accounting
for 16.5% of the variance (R2) in performance. As was
the case in Experiment 1, because here too we observed
statistically significant correlations among our predictors,
we have reported the results of regressions involving ac-
curacy on conflict and nonconflict problems separately
for each predictor (Table 3). As was the case before,
CRT emerged as the strongest predictor of performance
on conflict problems, but word span was also a significant
predictor. In contrast, individually, all four independent
variables emerged as significant predictors to perfor-
mance on nonconflict problems.
Neural
We began our analysis by first attempting to replicate the
basic findings reported in De Neys et al. (2008), despite
some differences between the designs of the two studies.
First, De Neys et al. (2008) reported that there was
greater activation in ACC (x = −2, y = 24, z = 44) when
they compared conflict to nonconflict problems, which
was attributed to the detection of conflict in the former
condition. Our comparison of those same conditions
here also revealed relatively greater activation in an iden-
tical location within a cluster that included ACC bilaterally
(x = −4, y = 24, z = 44; Z = 3.84, BA 32; x = 2, y = 28,
z = 38; Z = 3.79, BA 32), as well as the left superior
frontal gyrus (x = −14, y = 46, z = 44; Z = 4.18, BA 8;
Figure 3), and in a separate cluster overlapping with the
left middle temporal gyrus (x = −48, y = −70, z = 22;
Z= 4.33, BA 39). To observe whether the effect observed
in ACC was due to an increase in brain activation in con-
flict problems (rather than a decrease in brain activation
in nonconflict problems), we used the MarsBaR toolbox
(Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002) implemented
in SPM8 to calculate parameter estimates centered
around ACC as our ROI (center of mass: x = −2, y =
24, z = 44; radius = 10 mm)—separately for conflict
and nonconflict problems. The results illustrate that the
Figure 2. RT as a function of conflict in Experiment 2. Nonconflict
base rate = base rate response on nonconflict problems; Conflict base
rate = base rate response on conflict problems; Conflict stereotype =
stereotypical response on conflict problems. Error bars represent SEM.
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effect observed in ACC was due to an increase in brain
activation in conflict problems (Figure 3).
Next, and critically, De Neys et al. (2008) were also able
to show that, even when participants did not generate
the base rate response on incongruent problems, they
nevertheless activated ACC. This was interpreted to mean
that they were aware of their biased responding. In the
present experiment, we could not reproduce the identi-
cal contrasts because our design did not include neutral
control items (in which the individuating descriptions
were completely neutral) or heuristic control items (in
which the base rates were neutral). Instead, we con-
trasted conflict problems with an incorrect response ver-
sus nonconflict problems with a correct response. In
both cases, the response would be the same (i.e., consis-
tent with base rate), but only in the former type of prob-
lems would a conflict be elicited. Indeed, the results
demonstrated relatively greater activation in the former
condition in a cluster that included ACC bilaterally (x =
−4, y = 24, z = 44; Z = 3.79, BA 32; x = 4, y = 30, z =
36; Z = 4.27, BA 32), as well as the left superior frontal
gyrus (x = −6, y = 48, z = 36; Z = 4.05, BA 8), and two
other clusters overlapping with the left insula (x = −38,
y = 26, z = 4; Z = 4.77, BA 13) and the precuneus (x =
2, y = −56, z = 36; Z = 4.30, BA 7). Finally, De Neys
et al. (2008) had also reported that right IFG was acti-
vated more on conflict problems wherein participants
had generated base rate rather than stereotypical re-
sponses. This was interpreted to mean that the genera-
tion of the base rate response involved inhibition of an
intuitive response. That comparison did not result in
any significant activation in this study.
Next, we took two approaches for testing our focal
hypotheses (i.e., that CRT scores would predict perfor-
mance uniquely on conflict but not on nonconflict prob-
lems and that CRT scores would be related to brain
activation to a greater extent during conflict than noncon-
flict problems). We reasoned that convergent findings
across two approaches would reinforce the reliability of
our results. First, based on a median split, we divided
our sample into participants who scored high (M =
84%, SD = 15) versus low (M = 24%, SD = 19) on the
CRT, t(42) = 11.69, p < .001, d = 3.54. Next, an
Figure 3. Conflict and activation in the ACC. (A) There is relatively
greater activation in ACC in conflict versus nonconflict problems. SPM
rendered into standard stereotactic space and superimposed onto
sagittal MRI in standard space. Bar represents the corresponding
t score. (B) The parameter estimates illustrate that the observed effect
was due to an increase in brain activation in ACC in conflict problems.
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4. Cognitive reflection and activation in the PCC. (A) There was
relatively greater activation in PCC in participants with higher compared
with lower CRT scores in relation to conflict versus nonconflict
problems. SPM rendered into standard stereotactic space and
superimposed onto sagittal MRI in standard space. Bar represents the
corresponding t score. (B) The parameter estimates illustrate that,
across all participants, activation in PCC did not vary as a function of
conflict. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Vartanian et al. 1017
independent-samples t test involving the fMRI data dem-
onstrated that, compared with participants with low CRT
scores, in participants with higher CRT scores conflict
(compared with nonconflict) problems were associated
with greater activation in the posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC; x = 4, y = −44, z = 40; Z = 4.31, BA 31; Figure 4).
Second, we explored brain regions where activation
would covary as a function of individual differences in
CRT scores in relation to conflict (compared with non-
conflict) problems. Converging on a similar result as be-
fore, the PCC was the only brain region where activation
as a function of CRT scores covaried in relation to conflict
(compared with nonconflict) problems (x = 4, y = −48,
z = 40; Z = 3.71, BA 31).4 Next, we examined whether
individual differences in CRT scores would predict brain
activation in the PCC in conflict (vs. nonconflict) contrast.
Specifically, we used the MarsBaR toolbox (Brett et al.,
2002) implemented in SPM8 to calculate parameter esti-
mates centered around the PCC as our ROI (center of
mass: x = 4, y = −44, z = 40; radius = 10 mm) for
the conflict versus nonconflict contrast. The results re-
vealed that CRT scores were a significant predictor of
activation in PCC, β = .78, t = 2.17, p < .05 (Figure 5).
Indeed, CRT scores accounted for 10% of the variance in
PCC activation in relation to the conflict problems versus
nonconflict problems.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study was conducted to test two hypotheses. First,
focusing on behavioral data, we had hypothesized that
CRT scores would predict performance on conflict but
not on nonconflict problems. This hypothesis was con-
firmed across both experiments. Building on the findings
of Toplak et al. (2011) and Pennycook, Cheyne, et al.
(2014), our findings indicate that the tendency to think
reflectively is advantageous when working on problems
that pit intuitions against statistical norms. However, be-
cause our predictors were positively correlated, we also
tested their effects on conflict problems individually
(Table 3). With respect to Experiment 1, CRT remained
the sole predictor of performance on conflict problems.
In contrast, in Experiment 2, word span also emerged as
a significant predictor of performance on conflict prob-
lems. We believe that word span also emerged as a signif-
icant predictor because of the limited time window
available for making responses in the fMRI scanner. Spe-
cifically, the ability to process linguistic content likely
contributed to better performance on the task, as exhib-
ited by the fact that word span predicted performance on
both conflict and nonconflict problems in Experiment 2
(both of which require processing linguistic content).
Second, we also found support for the hypothesis that
CRT scores would be related to brain activation to a
greater extent during conflict than nonconflict problems.
Indeed, this was shown to be the case both when we
compared brain activation for conflict versus nonconflict
problems between participants with high and low CRT
scores, as well as when we examined regions of the brain
regions where activation covaried as a function of CRT
scores in relation to conflict (compared with nonconflict)
problems—both analyses pointing to the PCC (Figure 4).
Finally, CRT scores were a significant predictor of acti-
vation in PCC in conflict problems versus nonconflict
problems.
However, contrary to our expectation, CRT-related ac-
tivation in the brain was localized in the PCC rather than
the pFC or ACC. How might PCC function support the
kind of thinking that is captured by the CRT? We know
that the PCC is a core hub in the default mode network
(DMN; Zabelina & Andrews-Hanna, 2016) and that the
DMN typically exhibits deactivations during externally di-
rected or difficult tasks. Two possibilities that must be
ruled out are that (a) the observed correlation between
CRT scores and activation in DMN (i.e., PCC) in conflict
problems is due to reduced deactivation in this region in
conflict than nonconflict problems and/or (b) there is
less deactivation in DMN (i.e., PCC) in conflict problems
in participants higher (compared with lower) in CRT. We
can rule out the first possibility by observing the pattern
of activations in Figure 3B. Specifically, activation in PCC
across all participants does not appear to vary as a func-
tion of conflict. To address the second possibility, we fo-
cused on parameter estimates extracted using MarsBaR
from conflict and nonconflict problems as dependent var-
iables and compared differences in activation levels as a
function of CRT grouping (high vs. low). We found that
on conflict problems activation in PCC was significantly
greater in participants with high compared with low
CRT scores, t(42) = 2.15, p < .05, d = .65 (Figure 6).
In turn, there was no difference between the two groups
on nonconflict problems, t(42) = .03, ns, d = .01. Thus,
Figure 5. CRT scores predict brain activation in PCC involving conflict.
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we can rule out the possibility that there is less deactiva-
tion in DMN (i.e., PCC) in conflict problems in partici-
pants higher (compared with lower) in CRT. In fact, it
appears that there is greater activation in PCC specifically
in conflict problems in participants with higher (com-
pared with lower) CRT scores.
In contrast to early conceptualizations that character-
ized the DMN as a “task-negative network,” there is
now growing consensus to suggest that it is more optimal
to characterize DMN not in terms of its opposition to task
but instead “by the self-generated mental content that it
supports” (Zabelina & Andrews-Hanna, 2016, p. 87; see
also Callard, Smallwood, Golchert, & Margulies, 2013;
Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner,
2010). In turn, within the DMN and in relation to other
large-scale brain networks, PCC appears to play a key role
in regulating the focus of attention. For example, Leech
and Sharp (2014) recently conducted a large-scale sys-
tematic review of the patient and imaging literature on
the PCC to argue that not only is there evidence to sug-
gest that the PCC plays a direct role in regulating the fo-
cus of attention (Hahn, Ross, & Stein, 2007; Hampson,
Driesen, Skudlarski, Gore, & Constable, 2006; Gusnard
& Raichle, 2001; see also Pearson, Heilbronner, Barack,
Hayden, & Platt, 2011) but that “the role of the PCC could
extend beyond supporting internal thought, and rather
play a more active role in controlling the balance be-
tween an internal and external focus of attention”
(p. 23). This conceptualization of the PCC as a regulator
of attention between external and internal foci can help
us understand its possible functional relationship with in-
dividual differences in CRT scores. Specifically, CRT
scores could be a reflection of one’s ability to switch from
intuitive to analytic mode of thought in the service of
cognition (Frederick, 2005). Viewed from this lens, it
would appear that the PCC could be involved in facilitat-
ing this key feature of reflective thinking measured by
the CRT.
Importantly, the ability to switch from an intuitive to an
analytic mode of thought presumably also necessitates
inhibition; indeed, brain regions that underlie inhibition
have been shown to be related to individual differences
in CRT performance. Specifically, Oldrati, Patricelli,
Colombo, and Antonietti (2016) applied transcranial
direct current stimulation to the dorsolateral pFC—a
region associated with inhibitory control—to examine
whether doing so would modulate performance on the
CRT and other mathematical and insights tasks that
pitted an incorrect “impulsive” response against a correct
deliberative response. Their results demonstrated that,
following cathodal stimulations of the dorsolateral pFC
(that served to reduce inhibitory control), participants
made more errors on the CRT and similar tasks. These
findings suggest that the ability to inhibit incorrect pre-
potent responses is necessary for optimal performance
on the CRT. In addition, in conjunction with our results,
they suggest that a complete characterization of the neu-
ral underpinnings of individual differences involving the
CRT will likely involve multiple regions that will contrib-
ute various components to this higher-order ability index
that measures engagement in reflective thinking.
Interestingly, regarding nonconflict problems, we
found that matrix span was the best predictor of perfor-
mance in Experiment 1, whereas word span emerged as
the best predictor of performance in Experiment 2. It is
not surprising that, across both experiments, an STM
measure would be associated with performance on
nonconflict problems, where performance largely de-
pends on the ability to maintain the problem representa-
tion in the span of attention without the need to inhibit
stereotypical response tendencies or to switch attention
to an analytic mode—both of which necessitate the
involvement of executive functions. However, we did
not expect to find that different measures of STM would
emerge as predictors across the two experiments. It is
important to note that verbal and matrix spans were
strongly correlated in both Experiment 1 and Experi-
ment 2 (Table 3). We believe that the high correlations
are consistent with evidence that verbal and visuospatial
measures reflect a primarily domain-general construct
(e.g., Kane, Hambrick, Tuholski, Payne, & Engle, 2004).
As such, the findings across the two experiments regard-
ing nonconflict problems are largely consistent by isolat-
ing STM rather than intelligence or CRT scores as the
best predictor of performance.
On a more general level, it is also important to take
stock of what the joint findings of De Neys et al. (2008)
and those reported here indicate about cognitive pro-
cesses that underlie performance on base rate tasks.
First, De Neys et al. (2008) had shown that conflict prob-
lems activate ACC more than nonconflict problems and
Figure 6. CRT scores and activation in the PCC in relation to conflict
and nonconflict problems. Error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals.
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that ACC was activated regardless of whether participants
responded stereotypically or in accordance with base
rates. Here we also found that ACC was activated more
in conflict than nonconflict problems and that it was also
activated when participants responded incorrectly on
conflict problems. Together, these findings suggest that,
even when participants perform poorly, it is not because
they neglect base rates. Activation in ACC suggests that
there is some awareness of conflict. Second, we did not
replicate De Neys et al.’s (2008) finding that the right IFG
was activated more on conflict problems wherein partic-
ipants had generated base rate rather than stereotypical
responses. We argue that one would expect to observe
activation in the right IFG if the majority of the partici-
pants consistently applied the same strategy (i.e., inhibi-
tion) for responding in accordance with base rates
throughout the task. However, there is recent evidence
to suggest that people can respond in accordance with
base rates heuristically (Bago & De Neys, 2017; Newman
et al., 2017; Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, & Thompson,
2014). If so, then it is likely that our participants relied on
various strategies to arrive at “correct” solutions to con-
flict problems, which in turn would be associated with a
nonhomogenous pattern of neural activation across the
sample. Future studies in this area would benefit by
manipulating strategy choice through the use of the
two-response paradigm (see Newman et al., 2017;
Thompson & Johnson, 2014; Pennycook & Thompson,
2012; Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011)
to examine the neural correlates of correct solution as
a function of employed strategies.
We end by highlighting some of the limitations of our
experiments that need to be considered while evaluating
our findings. First, because of its small sample size, Ex-
periment 1 was likely underpowered for testing hypoth-
eses related to individual differences in performance on
heuristics and biases tasks. Second, given the positive
correlations reported among intelligence, STM, and
CRT scores, both experiments suffered from multicollin-
earity issues. As such, the relative power of CRT above
intelligence and STM for predicting performance on the
base rate neglect task and its neural correlates requires
replication for assessing its reliability. Third, our neural
analyses were based on the prompt time point (see
Pennycook, Cheyne, et al., 2014), although the relevant
information was available upon the presentation of the
base rates. In that sense, the neural correlates of conflict
detection can also be examined in relation to that time
point. Fourth, our design did not include an independent
task that could be used to assess PCC’s functional contri-
bution to performance on the base rate neglect task. Cer-
tainly, not only do our inferences regarding PCC’s
function require direct verification, but a full characteriza-
tion of the neural underpinnings of reflective thinking as
measured by the CRT will likely extend beyond PCC. Nev-
ertheless, based on our results, we believe that PCC
could play an important role in understanding the neural
basis of individual differences in reflective thinking in
relation to performance on heuristics and biases tasks.
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Notes
1. In two-response paradigms, the participants are instructed
to give a first intuitive response as quickly as possible. After-
wards, they get time to reflect and give a second, final response.
The two consecutive responses are taken to result from intui-
tive and reflective processing, respectively.
2. Note that, although responses in line with the base rates
are referred to as “correct,” strictly speaking the stereotype-
based responses do not necessarily represent normative viola-
tions. Accuracy here reflects the percentage of responses in line
with base rates.
3. Incorrect nonconflict responses were not included in this
analysis because of their rarity.
4. In MarsBaR implemented in SPM (Brett et al., 2002), we
also produced a spherical ROI (radius = 10 mm) around the
PCC found in the first analysis. The activation in the PCC in
the second covariation analysis survived cluster-level Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons within the ROI.
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